The Meeting of East and West

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING WORLD UNDERSTANDING

BY

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PREFACE

The state of mind following the recent war differs from that subsequent to the previous one. Then everyone supposed there were no ideological conflicts. The war had been fought to "save the world for democracy" and with the defeat of the Kaiser democracy supposedly had won. Only later did disillusionment appear, and even then its real meaning was not understood.

Now ideological conflicts are present everywhere. It is evident to all that the fate of peace depends in considerable part on whether the traditional democracies and communistic Russia can reconcile their economic, political and religious doctrines sufficiently to get on together. But this more obvious ideational issue is by no means the only one. Nor is it the most important one.

Jewish aspirations are at odds with an Arabian culture in Palestine. The Mohammedan version of a good society conflicts with that of the Hindu in India. The medieval Roman Catholic aristocratic conception of moral and social values grounded in naturalistic Aristotelian divine law opposes the modern Protestant democratic and pragmatic concept of an ecclesiastical and civil law which derives its authority solely from the humanistic conventions of a majority of men. Similarly, in the Orient, political institutions and religious observances inspired by Shintoism combat, even in Japan, those which are the fruition of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. And in Pan-America the traditional Latin-American ideals and values conflict with those of traditional Anglo-America. It is literally true in all these instances that, in part at least, what the one people or culture regards as sound economic and political principles the other views as erroneous, and what the one envisages as good and divine the other condemns as evil or illusory.

The time has come when these ideological conflicts must be faced and if possible resolved. Otherwise, the social policies, moral ideals and religious aspirations of men, because of their incompatibility one with another, will continue to generate misunderstanding and war instead of mutual understanding and peace.

It is hardly likely that these sources of conflict can be faced and removed in practice within the halls of parliaments and the heated actions of the market place, where slogans are carelessly bandied about,
Where standards differ there will be opposition.
But how can the standards in the world be unified?

Mo-ti.
Preface

special interests are at work, and passions are easily aroused, unless the problems raised are first traced to their roots and then resolved in theory within the calmness of the study where the meaning of words like "democracy" and "communism" can be carefully determined and the issues which they define can be looked at more objectively. It is with this timely, important and difficult undertaking that this book is concerned, as its subtitle indicates.

It happens, however, as Chapter I will show, that the most important ideological conflict confronting our world is the one rendered inescapable by the major event of our time—the meeting of East and West. Within the all-embracing and deep-going issues raised by this momentous occurrence the other ideological conflicts of our world are partial components. Hence, the title of this book.

Because of its subject matter, the contents of this book fall into two major parts: the one, a determination of the differing ideological assumptions of the major peoples and cultures of the West, culminating in Chapter VIII on the meaning of Western Civilization; the other, a similar study of the major peoples and cultures of the East, summarized in Chapter X on the meaning of Eastern Civilization. By combining the ideological assumptions of the traditional West with those of the traditional East, it then becomes possible in Chapter XI to understand, in its barest elements, the behavior of contemporary India, Japan and China. This also permits the fundamental problem underlying the ideological conflict between the traditional East and the traditional West to be determined, just as in Chapter VIII the fundamental problem at the basis of the ideological conflicts of the West is made explicit.

It happens by good fortune that the problem in the one case is identical with that in the other. Thus the task in Chapter XII becomes that of solving this basic problem.

The analysis of this problem guides one to its solution. This solution defines a more inclusive truly international cultural ideal which provides scientifically grounded intellectual and emotional foundations for a partial world sovereignty. This ideal defines the criteria also for relating democracy and communism, Roman Catholic medieval and Protestant modern values, and Occidental and Oriental institutions so that they support and sustain rather than combat and destroy one another.

Because the basic problem to which the entire inquiry leads one turns out to be philosophical in character, its solution provides a philosophy of culture. Because it is found to rest on empirical evidence, or on factors inferred from such evidence by logical and scientific methods,

this philosophy of culture is also a philosophy of science. In fact, the basic philosophical problem to which the analysis of the ideologies of the diverse cultures of the world leads one is solved in Chapter XII only by means of evidence from an analysis of scientific method and the philosophy of science. Thus the humanities as exhibited in the ideal culture, and the natural sciences grounded in nature are essentially and intimately connected and reconciled.

Also, because Oriental culture and certain elements in Mexican culture turn out to be primarily aesthetic in character, yet aesthetic in a sense different from that of the classical art of the West, the philosophy of culture and of science to which the analysis takes one provides also a rich, more diversified and comprehensive philosophy of art. It is because of this essential connection of art with the problem and its solution that illustrations accompany the text of this book.

So much for the character of its contents. It remains to note certain necessary explanations concerning the form of presentation, especially with reference to quotations.

In any chapter in which a quotation appears it is always accompanied by the name of its author. Any exception to this rule means that the quotation is by the author of the previous quotation.

No footnotes in book or page references appear anywhere in the text. Thus the reader suffers no interruptions to his vision as he reads, and the minimum amount of paper, for a manuscript completed during the paper shortage of war is required. Nevertheless, the title of any book quoted, its publisher, date, and the page numbers from which the quotation is taken can easily be found by anyone who is interested. Turn to the back of this book and look under the references for the chapter in which you are reading for the name of the author of the quotation. Following the author's name the desired information will be found. The page number or numbers from which the quotation or quotations from a given author are taken appear immediately following the date of publication in the order in which the items, if more than one, are quoted.

Especially in the chapter on the culture of Mexico, there are quotations, translated into English, from books printed in Spanish. These translations of the quoted material are by me.

My gratitude and indebtedness for permission to reproduce the paintings which appear in the illustrations and for permission to quote at more than the briefest length from other works is indicated in the specific acknowledgments which follow this preface. Even so, in so
CHAPTER I

THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Ours is a paradoxical world. The achievements which are its glory threaten to destroy it. The nations with the highest standard of living, the greatest capacity to take care of their people economically, the broadest education, and the most enlightened morality and religion exhibit the least capacity to avoid mutual destruction in war. It would seem that the more civilized we become the more incapable of maintaining civilization we are.

The paradox appears in a purely verbal, but none the less important, form with respect to the second major war of this century. Strictly speaking, it is the first world war. This fact has momentous significance.

To be sure, the previous war claimed this title for itself. Actually, however, it was primarily a Western conflict, in which a few Oriental peoples found it expedient to participate. It began in the Balkans. It was fought for the most part on the European continent. Its peace settlement was determined almost entirely by Westerners and signed at Versailles.

Its successor opened, on the contrary, in the Orient with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The implications for the West became evident immediately when Japan demonstrated the impotence of the peace policy of Versailles and of the more isolationist program of the Republican administrations in the United States by withdrawing its delegates from the League of Nations and flouting the Kellogg Pact without penalty. This gave Mussolini his cue and Hitler his courage. Abyssinia followed. Then, as an essential part of the complicated pattern, came the Spanish Civil War with its unresolved conflicts between medieval religious and cultural institutional forms and modern economic, democratic, or communistic values, of which Italy with Germany and Russia took advantage, on opposite sides, to gain invaluable experience in testing their ideological aims and their military instruments. Meanwhile an initially pacificist England and a fearful, hesitant France attempted, unsuccessfully, to remain indifferent. This was followed by Munich with its dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the later German
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declaration of war on Poland, which brought in Great Britain and France and engulfed Denmark and Norway, while Russia, playing for time as she protected her right flank with an invasion of Finland, arranged a pact with Germany. But Germany’s ambition and the forces set in motion were not to be withstood. The German attack on Russia followed, thereby continuing a world movement from Manchuria across Europe and through Siberia to Asia which came full circle with the Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbor. It was an attack by an Oriental rather than by a European nation which brought the United States officially into this war.

The global character of the conflict becomes the more evident when one notes its universal accompaniment. Modern Western nationalism has been copied by Japan; it has been established in China; and it has become a world issue in India, even gripping Gandhi and his followers who would prefer the Oriental method of non-action. Everywhere throughout the world, on both sides of the battle line and among neutrals and pacificists as well as belligerents, and in peace as well as in war, this modern Western phenomenon—the positive insistent spirit of nationalism—is abroad and at work. This does not speak well for the peace of the future. It means, unless we are willing to examine and reconstruct the diverse political aspirations and conflicting cultural ideals of our time, learning how to relate them so that they reinforce and sustain rather than combat and destroy one another, that the increasingly intense and destructive wars of the West in every generation are about to engulf not merely Japan but the whole of Asia. No longer will it suffice to watch the Balkans, the Polish Corridor, or the Rhineland. There are danger spots everywhere—in the South Pacific, Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Burma, Latin America, and even between the Mohammedan and Hindu provinces of India.

This, however, is but half of the story. The East is doing more than merely respond to Western political, economic, military and religious doctrines and influences. It is also for the first time seriously and positively bringing its traditional and contemporary culture and influence to bear upon us, and insisting that we alter our military, political, and economic decisions and even our cultural ideals under the impact of hers. This is part of the meaning of the Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbor and of Mahatma Gandhi’s stand, even in face of the Japanese invaders, against the British Empire. But it is not only with bombs and passive resistance that the Orient is saying this to the West. It is also saying it more wisely, fortunately, with comradeship and with love. This is the meaning of the visit of Madame Chiang Kai-shek to

the United States and to Brazil. China is making herself felt upon America.

All this renders two things clear: First, each part of the Orient has left its traditional, passive, receptive attitude and is coming to impress its existence and values upon the Occident. Second, this coming can be evil and dastardly as well as it can be benign and beneficent. Which it will be in the future depends not merely upon the East but also upon the West, and in particular upon each knowing the other’s values and interests as well as its own.

Nor must it be supposed, because of the grace and the charm with which the beneficent influence has come, that China is any less determined than is Japan or Mahatma Gandhi’s India to stand on her own feet and insure that the West adjust its ideals as well as its practices to the impact of Oriental cultural values and interests. At the commencement exercises at Yale University in June, 1942, China’s Foreign Minister, T. V. Soong—of whom, it is well to remember, President Chiang Kai-shek is the brother-in-law—spoke as follows:

I should like to name the broad objectives for which my country believes it is fighting.

The first is political freedom for Asia. . . . China is fighting for her national independence; she aspires equally for the freedom of all Asiatic nations. There are, of course, here and there certain nations which may not be ready yet for complete self-government, but that should not furnish the excuse for colonial exploitation. . . .

Our second objective is economic justice. Political and economic justice go together; without one the other cannot flourish. Asia is tired of being regarded only in terms of markets and concessions, or as a source of rubber, tin and oil, or as furnishing human chattels to work the raw materials. The Atlantic Charter, first enunciated by Roosevelt and Churchill and later adopted by all the United Nations, may prove to be the Magna Carta of economic justice, which must be made a living reality.

We now know that political freedom and economic justice are by themselves illusory and fleeting except in an atmosphere of international security. . . . Past failures have not dimmed our hopes that an effective world instrument to dispense and enforce justice will arise. . . . China, with all other liberty-loving nations, will gladly cede such of its sovereign powers as may be required.

. . . Every month of this war has increased the almost unbearable strain on our people and army, but I feel I am justified in assuring you that we shall endure and prevail, and live to cooperate with you in fashioning the brave new world of the future.

These are not the words of a merely passive and receptive Orient. Because of the key position of the Soong family in the New China they are words to be reckoned with in world affairs.
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Furthermore, the Orientals generally are a very proud people. With a civilization thousands of years older than that of the West and, as the sequel will show, with aesthetic, religious and social values in many respects superior, as Western values are in other respects superior to theirs, they, like Westerners, have a right to be proud. This pride is such that they will not for always receive values from and make adjustments to the West, without giving as much or more in return. The Orient has shifted from a more passive and receptive to a more active and initiate role in world affairs.

This means that for the first time in history, not merely in war but also in the issues of peace, the East and the West are in a single world movement, as much Oriental as Occidental in character. The East and the West are meeting and merging. The epoch which Kipling so aptly described but about which he so falsely prophesied is over. The time is here when we must understand the Orient if we would understand ourselves, and when we must learn how to combine Oriental and Occidental values if further tragedy, bitterness, and bloodshed are not to ensue.

This is by no means an easy or a perfectly safe undertaking. The recent behavior of Japan is one result of the attempt to put the East and West together. The tragic impasse in India is another. Moreover, much more than the reconciliation of Oriental and Occidental values is involved, since the Western ideological issues between fascism and democracy, democracy and communism, and communism and medieval feudalism are now the issues of the Oriental nations themselves. This shows itself in the world war. It was not a war between the East and the West. Instead, it divided the East as much as it divided the West. Japanese were with Germans; China and part of India are with Great Britain, America, and Russia.

Even within local issues and regions the paradoxes do not cease. A militant Japan for a pacifist Gandhi who would oppose the West uses the Western idea of political nationalism to justify his opposition. A Marx or a Lenin who would bring about the fulfillment of democracy ruthlessly opposes the freedom of belief and speech which is its essence. An Atlantic Charter or Good Neighbor Policy, which would support democracy and the right of each people to choose its own political leaders, seems confronted with a contradiction when in Argentina, perhaps in Italy or in Spain, this policy puts kings or fascists or communists in office, and when in India temporarily, or in the islands of the

Pacific likely to be held by the United States as military bases, it rejects the principle of local autonomy which it affirms.

Even within the nation or the individual the situation is not different. In the United States during the 1930's a political policy based on tradition and sound economic and political theory ended in economic collapse and political defeat. It would seem that if we act upon the basis of the traditional Protestant religious individualism and the traditional laissez faire economic and political principles we fail to solve or even to face the inescapably social, national, and international problems and dangers of our time. If, on the other hand, we face our problems constructively, through the New Deal or by some other means, admitting the inescapable federal organization and action which this involves, then cross purposes and confusion result, and we seem forced to give up what our pulpit, our press, and our courses in economics have taught us.

Even into morality and religion the paradoxical confusion enters. The Germans who with Luther inaugurated the modern Protestant religion and who with Kant and Fichte created the modern moral idealism, and who have been indoctrinated with these Lutherans, Kantian and Fichtean philosophies for centuries, seem to be the least religious and idealistic in their arts. The British and Americans with their indigenously more empirical, scientific, and pragmatic attitude seem to be the more considerate of others both morally and religiously. Yet many contemporary Anglo-American moral and religious leaders blame science and pragmatism for the ills of our time, and urge that the cure is to be found in a morality and religion independent of science after the manner of Luther, Kant, Fichte, and the Germans. Similarly, the contemporary American conservative charges the leaders of the New Deal with being mere self-seekers, while the New Dealers describe the conservatives as selfish individualists and "economic royalists," devoid of an honest capacity to face facts, and without the guidance of a liberal idealism. Likewise, Protestants and Roman Catholics, Christians and Jews, Jews and Arabs, and Mohammedans and Hindus are suspicious, if not positively antagonistic, toward one another, getting on together at all more in spite of than because of their religion. All Western religion often requires its adherents to regard their own gospel as true and, hence, to look upon Oriental religion as false, inferior, negative, or heathen; while, conversely, Oriental sages term their culture superior, in the things of the spirit, to that of the West.

These considerations all remind us that neither war nor the peace-
of contemporary India, Japan, and China becomes in part at least explicable.

The final problem then remains (a) of attempting to determine the correct relation between the basic beliefs and values of the East and West and (b) of resolving the theoretical issue underlying the conflicts between democracy and communism, Latin and Anglican values and the medieval and the modern world within the West (Chapter XII). It turns out by good fortune that the theoretical issue in both cases is the same, and that the solution of the fundamental problem underlying the conflicts and issues of the contemporary West provides a criterion of the good also for solving the major problem confronting our world of merging correctly and safely the civilizations of the East and the West.

It is because this problem and its solution necessitate the inclusion of Latin and Oriental intuitive aesthetic values that the illustrations form an essential, rather than merely illustrative, part of this book. It is for this reason also that we come out, in Chapter XIII, with a philosophy of art as well as a philosophy of culture. And because, especially in the West, have their conception of sound economic or political policy and good religious doctrine defined by technical, abstract terms such as those of John Locke, Jevons, Marx or St. Thomas Aquinas, no escape from the consideration of these technical matters is possible in what follows. To do less than this is merely to scratch the surface of things, instead of getting to the heart of the difficulty and to its solution. These technicalities have been kept, however, in contact continuously, as far as is possible, with aesthetically vivid and concrete materials. Consequently, if one stays with the abstract theories they gradually become familiar and one comes out inevitably into the concrete exciting, and at times tragic, world of daily life. For this world in considerable part in its most significant manifestations is but the later reflection of the earlier technical scientific, philosophical, aesthetic and religious beliefs.

Certain cautions are to be noted. This entire inquiry is concerned only with the ideological issues of our time. To be sure, from chapter to chapter concrete materials, facts, and historical events are presented, but this is done solely to illustrate and enable one to discover the theoretical or intuitive economic, political, aesthetic and religious doctrines which predominate in the culture in question, and to penetrate beneath the surface of things to the basic issues and problems around which these doctrines turn. No attempt is made to indicate all the ideological factors. Only those most influential as measured by majority opinion and the more pressing ideological issues of our time are considered. Actually in any culture there are as many different theoretical beliefs as there are different individuals or different opinions of the same individual at different times. Usually, however, certain beliefs capture a majority opinion. It is with these major beliefs only that the worldwide scope of our inquiry permits us to concern ourselves. Consequently, the reader must not expect a complete account of all ideological factors in society or history on the one hand or a consideration of the role of non-ideological factors, such as climate, geography, famine, disease, etc., on the other.

It is not maintained, therefore, that everything in culture and history is determined by the beliefs of men—their specific economic, political, aesthetic, philosophical and religious doctrines. It is maintained, however, with the sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, and with an increasing number of students of society such as Clyde Kluckhohn, B. L. Whorf, D. D. Lee, L. K. Frank and David Bidney, that these ideological factors are very important elements in the total situation—much more important than most people suppose, and that any approach to the issues of war and peace which neglects them does not face the full complexity of the difficulties confronting our world, and to that extent is doomed to failure. As R. B. Perry has noted, "If a factor such as an ideal makes any difference, there may be situations in which it makes all the difference."

But it must be noted with equal insistence that an approach which overlooks the non-ideological factors in history and society and the de facto state of affairs is equally incomplete and inadequate, even after the final conclusions of our inquiry are obtained. The adequate social ideal for our world must be supplemented with the empirical social scientists' information concerning the actual state of affairs. Only with an adequate ideal for society and a realistic knowledge of the actual state of society can wise practical action be determined.

But this distinction between correct normative social theory and correct de facto social theory presents a problem—the final paradox of social thought generally. Since a social ideology defines an ideal or goal toward which we are moving, and hence differs from what is in fact the case realistically, what criterion can there be for determining the validity or invalidity of a given ideology? It is difficult to see how a theory can be tested without appeal to fact, yet in the case of normative social theory correspondence with the social facts clearly is not a decisive criterion. Thus, it is never taken as an argument against the democratic
ideal for the state that the factual behavior of Germans is out of accord with it. Nor is the fact that no person is a perfect Christian taken as proof of the invalidity of the Christian ideal. But if correspondence with the social facts is not the criterion of the truth of an ideology, how then can its truth be determined? It would seem that we must have some factual criterion for determining the validity of one social ideal rather than another, and yet that the character of any normative social theory is such that the failure of social facts to conform to it is in considerable part irrelevant to its validity. This is our final and main paradox.

Unless we can resolve it, everything which follows will be arbitrary. For the paradox raises nothing less than the question whether there is any meaning to the statement that one ideal is more correct than another.

Consequently, the problem confronting us is even more difficult than the previous description of its worldwide extent and complexity has indicated. For we not only have to investigate the rival ideological issues of the world, but we have to initiate this undertaking without any clearly accepted conception of what the method is for determining the correctness of one ideology as compared with another. In other words, as we take up one culture after another, we must not merely seek out the theoretical assumptions determining its ideological component, but we must also see if such an inquiry will not reveal to us the method for determining the correctness of one ideology as compared with another in the case of conflicts between them.

It is believed that the following inquiry resolves this methodological paradox and problem of our world as well as its other paradoxical conflicts and confusions. But the time has now come to let the evidence speak for itself.

CHAPTER II

THE RICH CULTURE OF MEXICO

The Sunshine Limited had swerved and twisted through two interrupted nights and a novel but wearisome day from San Antonio to Mexico City. A spirited taxicab had sped by shops and parks reminiscent of Paris, skyscrapers with signs bearing the impress of New York, and past the heavy white marble Palace of the Fine Arts, to stop at the Spanish Hotel Majestic facing the colonial Catholic Cathedral and National Palace, which flank the distinctly Mexican Zócalo, whose lawns and gardens cover the Aztec ruins across the way.

There they were. All within one square mile. Five distinct and unique cultures: ancient, Aztec, Spanish, colonial, French nineteenth century, Anglo-American, economic, and contemporary Mexican. Harmoniously yet competitively, diverse and at times so tremendous and incredible that again and again one could hardly believe one's eyes.

Within the last of these cultures, painting as expansive and profound as it is vital and arresting. Frescoes with a form and sweep which would take one to Rome to find their equal. The human figure formed at times, as Justino Fernández has shown, with a skill comparable to that of Michelangelo, Tintoretto, and El Greco. Also, there is the music of Carlos Chavez, not to mention the names of notable poets, sculptors, and architects. Such is the rich culture of Mexico. Possessions of the imagination and the sentiments which, when we pursue them, intimate the meaning not merely of Mexico and Latin America but also of all America and Europe, providing even a tie and a bridge to Asia.

Two squares from the Cathedral is a former Encarnación Convent, covering an entire, exceptionally lengthy city block, now a redecorated government building housing the Secretariat of Public Education. This secular public usage of a former exclusive religious compound typifies the influence of the modern democratic and later positivistic French philosophy of Mexico of the nineteenth century upon the Medieval Catholic culture of its colonial period. Passing through its main entrance one finds oneself facing a large, open, primary square patio divided by the levels of open colonnades from a second large, open court beyond.
Chapter IX

The Traditional Culture of the Orient

The traditional culture of the Orient is extremely complex—so much so that many persons would urge that it is a large number of different cultures. The reasons for such an emphasis are evident. The Orient comprises many countries. These countries are separated by the highest of the world’s mountain ranges, by vast expanses of land and water, and by great differences of climate. The peoples also, even if they came from a common stem, branched off from this stem countless ages ago. It would be strange indeed if such naturalistic differences did not generate cultural diversities. This they have done. The dominant contemporary religion of Japan, Shintoism, is purely Japanese in origin. Two of the Chinese religions, Taoism and Confucianism, are Chinese in origin. Buddhism and Hinduism arose in India. Mohammedanism came into India and the Pacific Islands from the Middle East. There are other religions, important but less influential, of purely Indian origin. Within each of these religions there are many forms. In Buddhism and Hinduism these forms are so technically and highly developed and so different that at the extremes they seem to Westerners to be almost self-contradictory.

The Unity of Oriental Culture

Nevertheless, to specify these facts which distinguish one country or culture from the others is at the same time to indicate the equally evident interconnections and identities which tie them all together to constitute a single civilization of the East. Confucianism and Taoism are religions of Korea and of Japan as well as of China. Buddhism is as influential in China, Korea and Japan as are Confucianism and Taoism. Buddhism and Hinduism occur in India, Ceylon, the Malay Peninsula, and the Southwest Pacific islands. Confucius, for all his originality, continuously insisted that he obtained his wisdom from a laborious study of the ancient classics. Lao-Tzu, the founder of Taoism, went back to the ancient classics also. Moreover, as will be shown, what he found there is precisely what the Buddha found in the ancient classics of the civilization of India. Similarly, the founder of Buddhism claimed no originality, but insisted instead that he was returning a corrupted or overlaid Hinduism to its original source in the poetry of the early Upanishads and the even earlier Vedic hymns. As Franklin Edgerton has written, “Every idea contained in at least the older Upanishads, with almost no exceptions, is not new to the Upanishads but can be found set forth, or at least very clearly foreshadowed, in the older Vedic texts.” Thus, to specify the philosophical and religious differences entering into the constitution of the cultures of the East is at the same time to possess inescapable interconnections and identities. It is the unity provided by these essential relations and identities which merges the cultures of the Oriental countries into one traditional culture of the Far East.

This traditional culture is exceedingly old. This turns out also to be a bond of unity. Indian culture both Hindu and Buddhist has its present roots in the Upanishads and the even more ancient songs of the Vedas. Of the antiquity of the Vedas and of their present influence, Surendranath Dasgupta in his History of Indian Philosophy writes as follows: “When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins, who got the whole Vedic literature by heart, by hearing it from their preceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us through the course of the last three thousand years or more with little or no interpolations at all.” Dasgupta adds that certain scholars have placed their origin as far back as 4000 B.C. The date, however, is unimportant. The significant fact is that “the Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity.” Thus even if one goes back to the earliest date at which they may have been set down the “people had come to look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in time. . . .”

Confucius and Lao-Tzu, similarly, went back to the most ancient classics and tradition, and in particular to the “Eight Trigrams.” The date to which the Chinese tradition attributes the invention of these trigrams is 2852 B.C., when Fu Hsi is supposed to have founded Chinese civilization.

Contemporary Korea is distant from the origins and locus of Confucius, Lao-Tzu, and Buddha, in space as well as in time. Nevertheless, in his beautifully written autobiographical novel The Grass Roof,
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Younghill Kang, after describing the rather elementary economic conditions of his native Korean village and home as they existed at the opening of the present century, writes as follows:

Our home was not exempt from this miserable dependence upon the elements, but my family did not seem to mind their helpless poverty, since most of them were indulging in the mystical doctrine of Buddhism, or in the classics of Confucius, who always advocated that a man should not be ashamed of coarse food, humble clothing, and modest dwelling, but should only be ashamed of not being cultivated in the perception of beauty. The sage said: “Living on coarse rice and water, with bent arm for pillow, mirth may yet be mine. Ill-gotten wealth and honors are like to floating clouds.” A man has no place in society, Confucius teaches, unless he understands aesthetics.

Similarly Marco Pallis, in Peaks and Lamas, notes this same appreciation of the aesthetic upon the part of the humblest Tibetan peasant, taught him by his Buddhism, which Confucianism still achieves in present-day China, Korea, and in a momentarily submerged traditional Japan.

Younghill Kang adds:

My grandmother . . . was a true Oriental woman. The quietism of Buddha, the mysterious calm of Taoism, the ethical insight of Confucianism all helped to make her an unusually refined personality. Because of her lonely life . . . and because she was a woman, she was most attracted by the emotional elements of Buddhism. No one else in our house was a Buddhist. My father was a Confucian; my crazy-poet uncle was mostly a Taoist; only my grandmother loved best the stories and sayings of the pitting Buddha . . .

Similarly, Surendranath Das Gupta writes:

Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a day are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer verses two or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of an ordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system of image-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regular obligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals. Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with others and maintain their superiority by trying to prove that it and it alone was the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly their views. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be but mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held to be obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, in the inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legal transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authority from the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it to say that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of the past, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost all literatures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodox Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.

These ancient, intuitive insights and sentiments exhibit themselves in countless other ways throughout the entire Orient in all the specific, practical activities, family relations, and social institutions of the peoples. Having thus grasped these temporal and religious bonds of unity which merge the diverse cultures of the East into a single civilization of the Orient, thereby permitting approach to each part with an appreciation of its essential connections to the whole, it is now in order to examine the more specific instances of Oriental culture with respect to their concrete content and to determine the specific ancient Oriental doctrines which have to so great an extent made the empirical content what it is.

ITS INTUITIVE AESTHETIC CHARACTER

This content must be experienced to be known. This is true in a certain sense of any culture. But it is true of the East as a unique and much more fundamental way. For the genius of the East is that it has discovered a type of knowledge and has concentrated its attention continuously, as the West has not, upon a portion of the nature of things which can be known only by being experienced. The West, to be sure, begins with experience in the gaining of its type of knowledge and returns to experimentally controlled portions of experience in the confirmation of that knowledge. But the Western type of knowledge tends to be formally and doctrinally expressed in logically developed, scientific and philosophical treatises. The syntactically constructed sentences of these treatises, by the very manner in which they relate the key factors in their subject matter, enable the reader, with but incidental references to items of his imagination or bits of his experience, to comprehend
what is designated. Consequently, in the West, although appeals to experience are necessarily present and continuously made by the scientific, philosophic and theological experts who verify and construct its doctrine, nevertheless, providing the reader has an elementary acquaintance with the rules of grammar, and masters the Western technique for understanding things in terms of their verbally designated relations to each other, it is not necessary for the Western reader to squat upon his haunches, like a sage in an Indian forest, immediately apprehending and contemplating what is designated. Being concerned, as the West tends continuously to be, with the factor in the nature of things which is not immediately apprehended, but is instead merely suggested as a possible hypothesis by the immediately apprehended, the Westerner, trusting the reports of his scientific experts, supplemented with the ordinary, immediately apprehended items of his own direct experience, is enabled to a great extent by his books and texts alone to gain the type of knowledge which the West values, and to know the factor in the nature of things which this Western type of knowledge designates.

The Easterner, on the other hand, uses bits of linguistic symbolism, largely denotative, and often purely idiographic in character, to point toward a component in the nature of things which only immediate experience and continued contemplation can convey. This shows itself especially in the symbols of the Chinese language, where each solitary, immediately experienced local particular tends to have its own symbol, this symbol also often having a directly observed form like that of the immediately seen item of direct experience which it denotes. For example, the symbol for man in Chinese is 人, and the early symbol for house is 家. As a consequence, there was no alphabet. This automatically eliminates the logical whole-part relation between one symbol and another that occurs in the linguistic symbolism of the West in which all words are produced by merely putting together in different permutations the small number of symbols constituting the alphabet.

Sentences, furthermore, in Chinese are constructed by setting such purely individual symbols the one after the other in columns in the order in which the items which they denote in immediate experience are associated. Similarly, Chinese painting is often on scrolls which are several yards in length, the immediately apprehended aesthetic items being connected in the sequence in which they occur in the immediate experience of the artist. The need of bringing everything together into a geometrically balanced and theoretically conceived pattern, after the manner of the classic works of the great Western painters, is absent.

Even the written texts of prose writers and poets use a symbolism which is fundamentally merely miniature painting. Each character is literally painted with a brush, and the mastery of the various strokes of this brush, used in constructing the individual Chinese characters of the entire Chinese language, is the first thing which any Chinese painter of landscapes or of any other visual aesthetic materials must acquire. As Chiang Yee has written in his book Chinese Calligraphy, "The earliest inventors of handwriting moulded their characters upon actual objects... and although the later forms develop further and further away from direct pictorial representation, it is still possible to trace in them common visual links."

Consequently, instead of beginning, as does a student of painting in a traditional Western art school, with the laborious copying of the three-dimensional, geometrical casts of Greek statues, and then passing on to the three-dimensional living human figure in the nude, to master the use of perspective which the Western postulationally formulated science of geometrical optics has defined, the Oriental painter starts with the elementary brush strokes used in the writing of the countless symbols of the Chinese language. Since these symbols often merely put on paper in an immediately apprehended form certain characteristics of items of direct experience, it is an easy and natural transition for the painter to pass from the mastery of the strokes used in constructing the symbols of the Chinese language to the painting of the richer, more complete, immediately experienced aesthetic materials which these symbols frequently denote and from which, often, they had been abstracted.

It is to be emphasized that in the entire process no knowledge or application of theoretically formulated, scientifically verified, postulationally prescribed theory, either in itself or in its applications, is required. Nor is there necessity for even the common-sense conception of the subject matter which one is painting, as a three-dimensional, external, physical object. In fact, the first thing which the Chinese painter must acquire, aside from the mastery of the brush strokes used in writing the Chinese linguistic symbols, is the capacity to grasp the immediately apprehended aesthetic factors in the immediately experienced, aesthetic continuum in their purity and all alone, without any reference to the postulated three-dimensional, common-sense, external object of which they are the sign. It is precisely this factor which causes the Oriental painter, even after he has mastered his technique, to put his brushes and his easel aside and to go off alone into nature to sit and contemplate it for hours and even days until he grasps it, in its pure,
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Similarly, he shows a capacity to catch the exact shade of American humor and American slang to a degree which no Englishman, even though he is supposed to speak our language, can ever hope to achieve. But there is more than their linguistic symbolism behind this capacity of the Chinese. It goes back to, and is supported and sustained by, their ancient philosophical and religious intuitions. Unless we of the Occident find in our own immediate experience the factors to which their remarkably denotative philosophical and religious terminology refers, we can never hope, regardless of our information, or our observation, to understand either the Chinese or any other Oriental people.

But this fluidity of the Chinese language carries with it certain consequences. Since the symbols tend to be related merely as the items in the concrete, individual aesthetic experience are associated, the rules of grammar are less definite. Thus Lin Yutang points out that while this type of symbolism results in especially good poetry, it cannot compare with the language of the West in producing excellent prose. The reason is clear, as he has emphasized. In poetry the premium is upon rearing, in the immediately introspected imagination of the reader, with a minimum of symbols, the maximum amount of rich, subtly related, immediately felt aesthetic content. In prose the premium is upon a grammatical and logical ordering of the subject matter. Here the Chinese language, because of its fluidity, is at a disadvantage.

The spoken symbols of the Chinese language have the same immediate aesthetic quality. A Chinese who does not have a good ear can hardly speak his own language. Literally, the words have to be sounded as in choral training in the West. In the Cantonese dialect, for example, a sound which to the untrained English ear would seem to be continuously identical in its different repetitions actually is twelve different sounds, each of which has a unique meaning, depending upon slight differences in pitch or inflection, with which the otherwise similar sounds are uttered. As a consequence, if a person speaking Chinese becomes emotionally excited, thereby throwing his voice into a higher key than that required for the meaning which he desires to convey, he automatically says something having nothing to do with what he intended.

But it is not merely the visual and auditory symbols themselves which have this inseparable, insistently immediate aesthetic content. More important still, the totality of the nature of things which this symbolism denotes throughout almost the entire range of Chinese, and even Oriental knowledge, has this primarily aesthetic character also.
This is the reason why the Oriental, from one end of the East to the other, is continuously telling us that one can never understand what he is saying or writing by merely listening to or studying his spoken statements or published works alone and that one must in addition directly apprehend and experience, and then take time to contemplate, that to which they refer. This is the unique sense and the much deeper sense in which it is true to say that the Orient, to be known, must be immediately experienced.

For a Westerner, however, even this is not enough. One can experience the Orient by going there. Yet after doing this while studying the language for months or even years, it is possible to come away with certain basic, key, inescapable, intuitive impressions, yet possessing not even the slightest comprehension of what these experiences mean. Again and again individual Western religious leaders, with the most kindly and tolerant dispositions, men who are the most generously minded in their valuations of cultures other than their own, have gone to the Orient and especially to India and have come back to say that they found the religion "positively loathsome." These supposed value judgments, while having a certain superficial justification, can arise only in a mind which has no comprehension of what the religion in question has discovered and is proclaiming.

Again and again one meets missionaries, businessmen, and diplomats who have had immediate experiences of the specific empirical content of Oriental culture lasting through a major portion of their lives, who nonetheless come away seeing nothing in the religion and in the practices of the East that they do not regard as having been achieved in greater perfection in the religion and the practices of the West. It can be safely said that whenever this happens, for all the lengthy, immediate experience of the Orient which they have enjoyed, they have nevertheless failed completely to comprehend even the most elementary points concerning what it all means. Correctly to know and to understand the East entails not merely the having of immediate experiences of its concrete cultural forms and practices, but also the viewing of these immediately experienced facts from the Oriental rather than from the Western standpoint. For this, experience alone, essential as it is, is not enough. The basic Oriental premises which have made these experiences what they are, and which have defined the standpoint from which the Orient views them, must also be grasped. Otherwise the Westerner is merely fitting his factual information concerning the East into Western theories and assumptions and evaluating it from his standpoint rather than its own, in a manner which will never enable him to see its virtues or to appreciate its riches.

The premises which define the Orient's standpoint are to be found in its great traditional philosophical and religious classics. As Chiang Yee has written, "The course our painting has followed in China, in contrast with yours in Europe, can only be ascribed to our traditional philosophy." Only if one comes to the concrete empirical content of Oriental culture from the standpoint and by way of these classical Oriental doctrines can he hope to know the East or to discover its unique values.

Paradoxical as it may sound, it is nevertheless true that if one understands the basic theses of the traditional Oriental classics he can experience the East without going there. This seems at first sight to be an exceedingly self-confident Western attitude. A little reflection shows, however, that if the Oriental classics are saying something which is true, then this must be the case. For the immediately apprehended factors of experience to which the Oriental classical texts refer must be immediately apprehended facts, not merely within the experience of the Oriental, but also within the experience of anybody else in the world who takes the trouble, by a direction of his attention, to seek them out. When one has located in his own immediate experience the factors which the traditional Oriental doctrines designate as primary, he should then find himself automatically in the standpoint of the Oriental and able to share the concept of life from the point of view which takes these factors as primary. Just as one places oneself in the viewpoint of the communists by grasping the basic conception of the nature of things defined by the philosophy of Karl Marx, or just as one achieves the outlook of a traditional modern Anglo-American by viewing the nature of things and the meaning of human existence in terms of the doctrine of interacting material and mental substances of the philosophy of John Locke, so one should find oneself in the place of the Oriental when, by examining immediately apprehended experience under the direction of the classical Oriental treatises, one notes those factors in the nature of things which those treatises designate to be primary and ultimate, and then forthwith proceeds to conceive of the meaning and end of human existence from such a point of view.

It will be well to enter upon this undertaking, however, by way of the concrete materials, coming through them inductively and naturally
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to the traditional Oriental philosophical and religious doctrines. To this
end it will be wise, also, to begin with Chinese culture and with but the
Confucian factor in it, since the Confucian component stays the nearest
to common sense, is the most concrete in its teachings and imagery, and
is the nearest of any of the doctrines of the Orient to certain empirical
philosophical doctrines and moral teachings of the West.

CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM

Certain characteristics of the Chinese language call for further con-
consideration. Its signs themselves, whether visual or auditory, are, as has
been noted, heavily laden with aesthetic content quite apart from what
they denote. In many cases, however, the content of the sign itself, that
is, the actual shape of the written symbol, is identical with the imme-
diately sensed character of the factor in experience for which it stands.
These traits make the ideas which these symbols convey particulars
rather than logical universals, and largely derivative rather than con-
notative in character.

Certain consequences follow. Not only are the advantages of an
alphabet lost, but also, there tend to be as many symbols as there are
simple and complex impressions. Consequently, the type of knowledge
which a philosophy constructed by means of such a language can con-
vey tends necessarily to be one given by a succession of concrete, imme-
diately apprehended examples and illustrations, the succession of these
illustrations having no logical ordering or connection the one with the
other. This is the precise character of the writings of Confucius. He
ambles along in an informal conversational style with concrete,
common-sense examples. There is little of the technical terminology,
the formal definitions, or the logically connected reasoning which char-
acterizes practically all of the scientific and philosophical treatises of
the West. Moreover, even the common-sense examples are conveyed
with aesthetic imagery, the emphasis being upon the immediately
apprehended, sensuous impression itself more than upon the external
common-sense object of which the aesthetic impression is the sign.
Nowhere is there even the suggestion by the aesthetic imagery of a
postulated scientific or a doctrinally formulated, theological object. All
these, indigenously Chinese philosophies, Taoism as well as Confucian-
ism, support this verdict. Even when expounding one of its more
abstract teachings concerning the emptiness and yet the profundity of
"reason," Lao-Tzu, in the Tao-Teh-King, resorts to poetry:

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It will blunt its own sharpness,
Will its tangles adjust?
It will dim its own radiance
And be one with the dust.

This concern with the aesthetic object rather than the external
physical object, shows also in the poetry of Li Po:

I lift my wine-cup to invite the bright moon,
With my shadow beside me, we have a party of three.

In the Sayings of Confucius, this restriction to ordinary common-
sense objects and to these in their aesthetic immediacy is even more
evident. "There is pleasure," he says, as translated by Lin Yutang, "in
lying pillowed against a bent arm after a meal of simple vegetables with
a drink of water. On the other hand, to enjoy wealth and power with-
out coming by it through right means is to me like so many floating
clouds." A conversation with Kuang Hua proceeded as follows: "It
doesn't matter," said Confucius, "we are just trying to find out what
each would like to do. Then my friend replied, 'In late spring, when
the new spring dress is made. I would like to go with five or six grown-
ups and six or seven children to bathe in the river Ch'i, and after the
bath go to enjoy the breeze in the Wuyi woods, and then sing on our
way home.' Confucius heaved a deep sigh and said, 'You are the man
after my own heart.'

But it is also with family and wider social conduct that Confucius
is concerned, and especially with these in their moral aspects. Never-
theless, even in these matters the approach is step by step from concrete
particulars.

The acquiring of true knowledge depends upon the investigation of
things. When things are investigated, then true knowledge is achieved;
when true knowledge is achieved, then the will becomes sincere; when the
will is sincere, then the heart is set right (or then the mind sees right);
when the heart is set right, then the personal life is cultivated; when the
personal life is cultivated, then the family life is regulated; when the family
life is regulated, then the national life is orderly; and when the national life
is orderly, then is peace in this world. From the emperor down to the
common men, all must regard the cultivation of the personal life as the root
or foundation. There is never an orderly upshot or superstructure when the
root or foundation is disorderly. There is never yet a tree whose trunk is
slim and slender and whose top branches are thick and heavy. This is called
"to know the root or foundation of things." . . . I greatly admire a fellow
who goes about the whole day with a well-fed stomach and a vacuous mind.
How can one ever do it? I would rather that he play chess, which would
in the West has used all the arts to direct man's thought to and bring his emotional practical life into conformity with the different logically given, doctrinally designated, theoretic component in the nature of things with which it identifies the divine. So successful have the Buddhists been that Marco Pallis is moved to describe the largely Buddhist culture of Tibet as follows:

There is no phase of Tibetan life which is exempt from the all-leavening doctrinal influence, nor is it easy to pick out an object of which it could be said that its inspiration is purely secular. . . . The aim of ritual—and ritual must be regarded as a synthesis of all the arts, acting as the handmaids of Doctrine and collaborating towards one end—is to prepare the mind for metaphysical realization, to spur it on to pierce the veil of the finite and to seek Deliverance in Knowledge, that is, in identification with the Supreme and Infinite Reality. The latter is devoid of every determination whatsoever, even unity or goodness; that is why the least misleading title that the human mind is capable of inventing for it, is the Void Itself. No symbol can stand for it save only vacuity. The Jewish Holy of Holies, enclosing nothing except an empty space, must be saluted as a triumph of art. Apart from this special instance, all art must concern itself with forms; it is there where its sphere lies. Once it has helped to pilot the mind up to the frontier between Form and the next stage, the world of Non-form, its task is over. . . .

Even ritual is not efficacious in its own power. . . .

Another quite significant commentary upon the effect of Buddhism, coming as it does from a Westerner, is Marco Pallis's following remark: "... deification of race, or the nation, now so prevalent in many Western countries, is a serious and destructive form of idolatry. To read eternal qualities into things so utterly temporal is a symptom of low intellectuality." The Buddhist thesis that all sensed or introspected determinate things are transitory, is evident.

TRADITIONAL INDIA

Even before the impact of the West, traditional India was an exceedingly diversified and complicated culture. Western influences have made it more so. In 1949, India had a population of roughly 350,000,000. Of this total 239,000,000 were Hindus, 77,000,000 Mohammedans, approximately 13,000,000 Buddhists, 8,000,000 Animists, 6,000,000 Christians, 4,000,000 Sikhs, and a little more than 1,000,000 Jains, with roughly 100,000 Parsees or Zoroastrians. There remain slightly more than 2,000,000 representing minor religions.

These figures give the proportions of the various components of India's kaleidoscopic culture. They are misleading in only one respect. Buddhism has a greater influence in India than these figures indicate, because it has determined in part the character of Hinduism as well as being the guiding pattern of its own adherents. Since the basic doctrine and insight underlying Buddhist culture has been determined, the main task which remains in order to understand the culture of India is that of analyzing Hinduism and Mohammedanism with respect to their overt character and their underlying conceptions of the nature of man and the universe. One need add merely that the Buddhism of Tibet represents but some of the several forms of Buddhism, whereas in India are found all its many forms which the analysis of its philosophical doctrines has indicated. Roughly, the Buddhism of the Southern school is Hinayanic; that of the Northern school, Mahayanic. As Ananda K. Coomaraswamy has indicated in his Buddhist and Hinduism, "The two schools originally flourished together in Burma, Siam, Cambodia, Java and Bali, side by side with a Hinduism with which they often combined." The Southern, Hinayanic Buddhism survives today not merely in India but also in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. The Mahayanic Buddhism of the Northern school is not merely the Buddhism of Tibet, but also passed over into China, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan, to exist side by side with Taoism, Confucianism, and Shintoism and to become fused with them. In the latter countries the "greatest influence was exerted by the contemplative forms of Buddhism; what had been Dhyana in India became Cha'n in China and Zen in Japan." Thus India is the home of Buddhism as well as of Hinduism and Jainism.

When one first compares Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism, as they exhibit themselves in the concrete art, both painting and architecture, of India, what most impresses one is the difference between them. Instead of the serene calmness of the Buddha, interspersed at many points and times, to be sure, with manifestations of frenzy and fury, one finds in the wall paintings and the sculptured figures of the Hindu temples an overwhelming burst of differentiated passion and fury with a frank and most realistic emphasis upon sexual passion and erotic relations, which in the artistic symbolism and the ritual of the Hinduism of the Tantric doctrine becomes to Westerners not merely religiously incomprehensible but positively shocking.

Here, however, as at other points in Oriental culture, one must be cautious before allowing oneself to be driven suddenly to a conclusion. Many considerations warrant this caution.

The major one is that the Buddha himself, who lived, according to
tradition, around 600 B.C., continuously affirmed that there was nothing original in his teaching. Just like Hinduism in all its different forms and branches, the Buddha went back to the early Upanishads and the Vedic hymns and literature which were the Scriptures of the Hindus. In fact, the Buddha maintained that he was merely leading a Hinduism, which in time had become formalized, back to its own basic and initial insight and wisdom which even in the Buddha's time was in Hinduism and had been merely obscured by its practitioners. This requires one to examine Hinduism and especially its early sources before coming to the conclusion that it is radically and fundamentally different from Buddhism.

HINDUISM

The initial impression, when one examines the non-Buddhist, indigenously Indian philosophies and religions, as C. A. Moore has recently indicated, are their tremendous differences. Roughly, the early Hindu tradition and literature, that known as the Vedic, falls into four parts. These are termed the Samhitas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas, and the earlier Upanishads.

The first of these four, the Samhitas, are, as the literal meaning of the word indicates, “collections” of verses. These collections, as Suren-dranath Dasgupta indicates, are four in number; “namely, Rg-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda.” Of these the Rg-Veda is the most important, since the others are either repetitions of parts of it or its spirit, or applications in prayers or rituals. These Samhitas are largely in verse form and were sung, being memorized and transmitted from generation to generation. Note again this presence and importance of the aesthetic.

The Brahmanas were ritualistic and more theological in character and written in prose. They dealt with the diversified symbolism of the rituals and were exceedingly imaginative in character. The result, as Suren-dranath Dasgupta has written, was “the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic system...”

The Aranyakas, or “forest treatises,” were meditative in character; but meditative, as their name indicates, in a naturalistic setting. These forest treatises had the effect of breaking the more intelligent members of the religious tradition away from the Brahmanic emphasis upon ritual. Suren-dranath Dasgupta notes that forthwith philosophical spec-

ulation arose. To a Westerner, however, such a description must inevitably be misleading. One merely has to consider the character of these meditations, which their name indicates, to note that it was a meditation and a “philosophical speculation” arising in connection with an immediate apprehension and contemplation of nature, when one is immersed in an overwhelming Indian tropical forest. Out of these forest meditations which revived the original basic intuition of the Rg-Veda the philosophy and religion of the Upanishads arose.

In these Upanishads the philosophy and religion of Hinduism came to expression. Again it must be noted that the Upanishads are in verse form, and, as we shall see, these verses are heavily laden with aesthetic content.

According to the orthodox Hindus the attendant distinctions of Indian philosophy and religion fall into two main portions: (a) the nastika, the unorthodox, and (b) the astika, the orthodox. The basis of this distinction, according to the orthodox Hindus, is that the unorthodox group, made up of the Buddhists, the Jainists, and the Carvakian materialists, does not accept the infallibility of the Vedas; whereas the orthodox group does. This claim of the orthodox Hindus must be taken with certain qualifications: First, the leaders of the three unorthodox groups maintain the contrary, insisting that they still retain and in fact only properly give expression to the original Vedic wisdom. This has been noted also in the case of the Buddhists. Suren-dranath Dasgupta, and Sir John Woodroffe in his mature and profound Shākti and Shākta, make clear that it is equally true for the Jainists.

In the case of the Carvakian materialists, who affirmed the existence of material atoms, it is well to keep in mind the realistic Hinayanistic Buddhism of Vasubandhu to which reference has been made. This system, it will be recalled, was also materialistic, since it denied the existence of persisting substantial selves, while affirming the existence of external material objects. It might very well have affirmed also that these material objects were atomic as well as gross in character. It is well known, however, that in this materialistic Hinayanistic Buddhism of Vasubandhu there was no rejection of Nirvana. Perhaps the Carvakian materialists among the Hindus were like Vasubandhu among the Buddhists. Democritus in the West held a similar theory, affirming the existence not merely of the unseen, material atoms but also the existence of the immediately apprehended continuity of the sense world. The Russian scholar S. Luria has shown recently that it was by this
means that Democritus reconciled the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes in Greek mathematics with the atomic theory called for by early Greek physics.

Moreover, the Chandogya Upanishad, whose doctrine is attached to Vedic sources, was materialistic in the sense that it regarded everything including "the mind" as "consisting of food" as "the breath consists of water" and the voice consists of heat." These three atomic materials, food, water, and heat, as R. E. Hume's translation shows, were the elements from which all things, persons as well as the sun, the moon, and lightning, are made. When one inquires concerning what is meant by "food, water, and heat," one finds, as the name of the last suggests, that they are defined after the manner of Aristotle, Berkeley, and Hume in the West in terms of their immediately sensed qualities. Furthermore, there is no substantiality to the lightning apart from the three sensed forms which are its sensed qualities. Moreover, the sensed qualities are, as Galilei, Berkeley, and Hume maintain, "mere names." Thus the Chandogya Upanishad specifies, "Whatever red form the lightning has, is the form of heat; whatever white, the form of water; whatever dark, the form of food. The lightninghood has gone from the lightning: the modification is merely a verbal distinction, a name. The reality is just "the three forms."" Thus, the Carvaka materialist may have been materialistic merely in the positivistic and nominalistic sense of this Chandogya Upanishad. In any event, the matter is not important with respect to analysis of Indian culture, since this school of Indian thought never succeeded in gathering about itself a sizable group of followers. It has had very little effect upon either traditional or present Indian institutions.

The astika, or orthodox indigenous Indian philosophy, falls into six systems. These are called orthodox precisely because they are in basic agreement. Consequently, their differences and even their names are of no concern here. One may merely note that they range over almost all subjects from the nature of the "true self," through the Upanishads and the principles governing rituals to logic, metaphysics, law, and physics, including even semantics. One of these systems is sufficient for present purposes; namely, the Vedanta, since it treats of the basic philosophy of the Upanishads, especially as commented upon by Sankara; and it is this form of orthodox Hinduism which largely defines and determines the culture of most of the Hindu portion of traditional India. This philosophy of the Vedanta exhibits itself in the Upanishads and in the many different orthodox Hindu philosophies and religious practices which ground themselves upon the Upanishads, which in turn, as Franklin Edgerton indicated, express little not in the early Vedas.

In the examination of this orthodox Hinduism there are many advantages in selecting for investigation that specific one of the orthodox Hindu rituals and doctrines which is known as the Tantric Shakti. First, it is a form of orthodox Hinduism which is apparently not merely different, but most shockingly different, from Buddhism and Jainism, and even from other forms of orthodox Hinduism. If there is an identity of this extreme form of Hinduism with Buddhism, then the proof of agreement is established for all the other Hindu systems, since they differ less obviously from Buddhism than does the Tantric form. A second advantage is that attention concentrates upon a specific, concrete example, making it possible to study something definite with care, rather than to have attention dissipated and made superficial by an incomplete attempt to examine everything. The third is that we have at our disposal in the English language the translations of the main Tantric treatises and the product of a lifetime of immediate acquaintance with them in India and of mature reflection upon their meaning, by Sir John Woodroffe in his detailed, systematic, and profound Shakti and Shakti. In this instance the translation and study by an Englishman who has lived his life in India, rather than by a native Indian is an advantage, for if an Englishman, coming to the East with all the assumptions of the West, finds this apparently most shocking form of Hindu culture not merely identical in its main tenets with other forms of Hinduism and with Jainism and Buddhism, but also religiously profound and of unquestionable moral value, then the verdict is all the more impressive.

A few general considerations and references to the Upanishads will prepare the way for an appreciation and correct understanding of Sir John Woodroffe's conclusions. The first thing which the Hindu continuously emphasizes and impresses upon anyone who would understand the basic philosophical and religious insight of India is that it refers to something which must be immediately experienced to be known, and which cannot be attained by the logical methods of Western science, philosophy, and theology or described in any determinate way.

The first question to be asked in the light of this fact is why, then, the Orientals, both Hindus and Buddhists, as has been noted, have developed so many logically formulated philosophical systems in so
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many respects similar to if not identical with many systems of the West. The answer to this query is to be found in two considerations: First, even when the Easterner formulates such logically subtle and systematic systems, the words in these systems for the most part, although not always, tend to refer to immediately apprehended factors. They are thus concentrating on differentiated, transitory factors in the aesthetic continuum rather than logically inferred, theoretically formulated, external, common-sense, scientific, or philosophical structures of the Western type having to do with the theoretically known component in things. Second, even if, in the cases in which it occurs, the logical formulation of an Oriental system does involve reference to external common-sense or scientific objects of the Western type, these systems tend to be used not as in the West to show what the most important factor in the nature of things is, but instead to show what it is not. Consequently, for the Easterner, even when he develops logically formulated systems containing most subtle distinctions and technical concepts, his aim tends to be to direct the reader away from the persisting, postulated, determinate theoretical component in the nature of things in which the West believes, toward the indeterminate, indescribable, ineffable, and immediately apprehendable aesthetic factor, which neither logical methods nor philosophical or scientific theory can convey.

This shows itself throughout all the Oriental philosophies. In China, for example, as Hu Shih has made us aware, Mo Tih developed logical and scientific methods not unlike those of the West. An examination of his writings will show, however, that this logical reasoning was applied only to immediately apprehendable factors. Mo Tih writes, as translated by Hughes, “The universally true way of learning by investigation whether a thing exists or not is, without question, by means of the actual knowledge (on the evidence) of everybody’s ears and eyes. This is the criterion of whether a thing exists or not. If it has been heard and seen, then it undoubtedly is to be taken as existing.” When one moves on, however, to note how Mo Tih applies this empiricism, he finds that what he uses this method to verify is this same immediately experienced “all-embracingness,” the same indeterminate “all-inclusiveness” common to all persons and all aesthetic objects, which we noted to be at the heart of Confucianism and of Taoism. The manner in which the logically formulated systems of Buddhism functioned also, by means of the logic of negation, to direct man’s attention to this same immediately apprehended, indeterminate aesthetic continuum as the primary factor, has been previously noted. Thus both Mohism in China and Buddhism suggest the answer to the query. The Oriental asserts the primary factor in human nature and the nature of all things to be something which neither the formal methods of science and philosophy nor, determinate qualities can convey; and uses logically formulated doctrines, without contradiction, either positively to lead one toward the primary indescribable factor or else negatively to designate what the primary factor in the nature of things is not.

Hinduism itself supports this conclusion. Charles Johnston, in his commentary on the Kena Upanishad, summarizes the Hindu attitude as follows: “All rationalistic philosophies end, and inevitably end, in agnosticism. This is the one logical conclusion to the search for knowledge in that way by that instrument . . . having been inspired and set in motion by intuition . . . the rationalistic philosopher instantly turns his back upon intuition . . . Having begun with intuition, he should go on with intuition.” As the Katha Upanishad expressed it, “Nor is this mind to be gained by reasoning; . . . It is to be apprehended . . . by direct experience.” Surendranath Dasgupta, in his description of the logical, scientific, and rationalistic method of the West when used by the Indians as a negative method, adds: “We cannot describe [the positive factor toward which this negative method is guiding one] by any positive content which is always limited by conceptual thought.”

Turning to this positive factor in the Hinduism of the Tantric Shakta, one finds Sir John Woodroffe writing that it “is actual immediate experience . . .” He makes it clear, however, that the factor in knowledge which the treatises of this particular Hindu teaching are attempting to point out to men is not any specific immediate experience or the totality of immediate experience, but a factor in this totality which requires a definite practical method and procedure for its discovery by itself. He adds, furthermore, that the Orientals generally, Buddhists as well as Hindus, insist that this method is thoroughly scientific, different to be sure from the scientific methods of the West, but even more completely empirical and positivistic than the latter methods because no use of abstract, mathematical equations or formal, logical reasoning is involved. In fact, the Tantric, or other treatises describing this Eastern method, Sir John Woodroffe continues, “were regarded,” as a Tibetan Buddhist once explained to him, “rather as a scientific discovery than as a revelation.” Consequently, these treatises describe “a practical philosophy, . . . a philosophy which not merely argues but experiments. . . . All that exists is here. There is no need to throw one’s eyes into the heavens for it. . . . The claim of the Agama [the Tantric treatise on
method] is that it provides such means and is thus a practical application of the teaching of the Vedânta."

This method falls into two parts, the one the method of the ritual which takes one part of the way to the basic factor in immediate experience; the other the method of the Yoga, which takes one the rest of the way. "In order to understand the ritual," Sir John Woodroffe continues, "one must know the psychology of the people whose it is; and in order to know and to understand their psychology, we must know their metaphysic." The use of the word "metaphysic" here must not be allowed to lead anyone astray. In the Western sense of this term, these Easterners are not metaphysical at all; instead they are the most extreme positivists, since they insist that no reality exists except that which is immediately apprehended. The inferred, postulated type of knowledge of the West designating unobserved electrons, electromagnetic propagations, or the unseen God the Father they tend traditionally to deny. Thus they are metaphysical only in the sense that they claim to have noted an immediately apprehended factor in experience in addition to the data given through the specific senses.

Sir John Woodroffe writes of this factor: "As the Varâha Upanishad says it is 'The Reality which remains after all thoughts are given up.' What it is in itself is unknown but to those who become it. . . . It is [the] . . . boundless substratum which is the continuous mass of experience . . . [the] primordial extensity of experience . . ." It is termed "primordial" because "if it be not positive at the beginning, it cannot be derived at the end." What the Hindu is saying here is that this indeterminate boundless factor in immediate experience must be taken as an irreducible element in scientific and philosophical knowledge. It cannot be defined in terms of, or deduced from, anything else, whether this something else be its immediately apprehended differentiations given through the senses or the inferred, syntactically designated, indirectly and experimentally verified theoretic component in things.

From this it follows that all things, whether they be non-human or human natural objects, must be conceived as made up of this boundless indeterminate aesthetic factor as one of their irreducible, elementary components. It follows also that the individual, local, determinate, conscious self is not to be conceived as a postulated, persistent, mental substance which, by means of some mysterious faculty, projects out of itself the emotionally moving, aesthetically vivid, immediately apprehended differentiated aesthetic continuum. The logical and the causal order is precisely the reverse of this. Instead of the undifferentiated or

the differentiated aesthetic continuum being projected and known by faculties of the postulated substantial self, or modern Western mental substance, the emotionally laden aesthetic self and the emotionally laden aesthetic object must be conceived as constituted of the irreducible aesthetic continuum. We are conscious, emotional, aesthetically luminous creatures not because we are a purely spiritual or purely mental, reflexively presupposed, or postulated, substance; but because we, like all other aesthetically immediate determinate things in the universe, whether they be the knowing subject (purusha), or the known object (prakriti), are constituted of the emotionally moving, aesthetically ineffable, indeterminate aesthetic continuum. As the Tantric doctrine puts it, Chit, the "unchanging formlessness" is the source of consciousness in the self.

Of Chit, Sir John Woodroffe writes:

There is no word in the English language which adequately describes it. It is not mind: for mind is a limited instrument through which Chit is manifested. It is that which is behind the mind and by which the mind itself is thought. . . . The Brahma [which is identical with Chit] is mindless. If we exclude mind we also exclude all forms of mental process, conception, perception, thought, reason, will, memory, particular sensation and the like. We are then left with three available words, namely, Consciousness, Feeling, Experience. To the first term there are several objections. For if we use an English word, we must understand it according to its generally received meaning. Generally by "Consciousness" is meant self-consciousness, or at least something particular, having direction and form, which is concrete and conditioned; an evolved product marking the higher stages of Evolution. According to some, it is a mere function of experience, an epiphenomenon, a mere accident of mental process. In this sense it belongs only to the highly developed organism and involves a subject attending to an object of which, as of itself, it is conscious. . . . If then we use (as for convenience we do) the term "Consciousness" for Chit, we must give it a content different from that which is attributed to the terms in ordinary English parlance. Nextly, it is to be remembered that what in either view we understand by consciousness is something manifested, and therefore limited, and derived from our finite experience. The Brahma as Chit is the infinite substratum of that.

Furthermore, Chit "is immediacy of experience." But it is "undifferentiated (Abhinna), all-pervading (Sarvatvavastha), . . . pure (Shuddha) experience." In short, Brahma in Hinduism is the same immediately apprehended, undifferentiated aesthetic continuum which was found to be Tao in Taoism, jen (human-heartedness) in Confucianism, and Nirvana in Buddhism.
Mind, on the other hand, is a localized, differentiated limited portion of the otherwise undifferentiated boundless Chit or Brahman. Thus whereas Chit is unchanging and formless, mind is transitory, changing, and limited or formed. Hence, mind arises as does an immediately sensed, differentiated natural object, when Chit, or the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, becomes limited and in certain parts determinate, because of its differentiations. Consequently, mind, or the full, determinate personality, is for the Hindu as for the Buddhist no more immortal and able to escape the death which overtakes all determinate, differentiated things than is the determinate natural object. Only the portion of mind and the object which is Chit, the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, is timeless and escapes "the ravages of death."

But Chit, or Atman, the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, is in the immediately apprehended natural object in its empirically given aesthetic character as much as it is in mind. As R. E. Hume's translation of the Sveta-svata-tara Upanishad expressed it,

The Soul (Atman) which pervades all things
As butter is contained in cream, . . .
This is Brahma, . . .

Thus, both mind or the determinate personality and the natural object are constituted of (a), Chit or Brahman, common to all things, and (b), the qualities (guna) differentiating one determinate part of Chit from another determinate part. As Sir John Woodroffe writes, "This appearance of Consciousness [in mind] is due to the reflection of Chit upon it." Similarly, all determinate natural objects, whether they be persons or flowers, or mountains, or streams, are made up of two aesthetic factors which the Tantric Hinduism terms the Chit-Shakti and the Maya-Shakta. The former is the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum which is in all objects in their purely empirically given, immediately apprehended component as well as in all persons; the latter is the limiting principle, or the sensed differentiations distinguishing one object in the complex aesthetic continuum from another, and the determinate self from its determinate object.

It follows from this that if it may be possible, by some experimental technique, to eliminate the Maya-Shakta differentiations from the complex aesthetic continuum, so that only the emotionally moving, aesthetically inexpressible, indeterminate field factor in it remained, then all distinction between the knowing subject and the known object, and between the personal self and the non-personal natural object, would be escaped. The knower would be identical with its object, and the object would be identical with the knower.

It is precisely this which the Oriental method known as the Yoga attempts to achieve. It is to be emphasized that the method is perfectly definite and practical. It is a straightforward matter of experimentation as to whether or not it is possible to eliminate all differentiation from the totality of immediately apprehended fact, and whether anything positive remains when this is done.

One technique for doing this is as follows: The experimenter goes into the mountains, usually up a high valley, and sets up a laboratory. This laboratory consists of a small, thick-walled building completely tight on all sides. The man puts himself in this small building and in certain cases has the doorway completely filled in except for one small opening sufficient to permit entrance of a minimum of food and air. Outside of this opening he also may have a lean-to with a small doorway, just large enough to let some attendant enter with the necessary food. This entrance is placed on a side of this lean-to which is not directly opposite the opening into the main experimental chamber. By this technique the experimenter eliminates from the immediately apprehended differentiated aesthetic continuum all differentiations which arise from the sense of sight. The location, high up a mountain valley, and the thick walls help also, especially when there is not a heavy wind outside, to eliminate all differentiations due to the sense of hearing. By keeping food at a bare minimum and by avoiding all exercise as far as health will permit, one also cuts to a minimum the differentiations arising from the bodily senses. Even this, however, is not enough. One must remain in this state until one also eliminates from the immediately apprehended aesthetic continuum, all differentiations due to thought and imagination. Not until all these differentiations are eliminated does the crucial experiment give a decision with respect to the question it is devised to answer.

Westerners as well as Orientals who have performed this experiment report that the outcome is precisely what the Oriental philosophical and religious doctrines maintain. Instead of being left with nothing, as the Westerner first supposes would be the case, because of his unconscious habit of identifying the whole of the nature of things with a determinate kind of thing, the report is that one is left with one of the most emotionally overwhelming, aesthetically inexpressible experiences, with no sense either of self or of objects, which it is within the possibility of man to enjoy; and that even though this experience is indeter-
of the ritual. In this manner people are classified in society according to their differing capacities to achieve Brahman in its purity without any differentiations. That individual or group of individuals is called the most perfect, which comes the nearest to the experience of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum in its purity. It is in this conception that the caste system of India, in part at least, has its basis. The untouchables, some 70,000,000 in number, are orthodox Hindus with the Brahman in them, yet at the bottom of the ladder of caste. So deeply is this system rooted in India, Krishnalal Shridharni informs us, that when “some years back, Gandhi staked his life on the cause of the untouchables, the whole of India, from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal, was thrown into a terrific seizure of anguish and alarm.” Recent developments are altering this attitude.

The position of this outcast group in the Indian social system is not unlike that of a similar outcast group in the Anglo-American and Western world. Both groups owe their unfortunate social status to religious and moral beliefs. Those in the West, like the untouchables of India, are not cast out because they are completely bad or completely outside the pale of religion, as the conversation of Christ with the woman at the well clearly demonstrates. The Western outcasts, like the Indian untouchables, are where they are because the divine goodness which is in them, at least potentially, is associated with so many other factors that people in a higher status in the social scale cannot associate with them without being ostracized.

Nevertheless, there is an important difference between the two groups. Whereas the criterion of the outcast group in the West is sexual in character, the untouchables of India, as we have noted, are cast out for quite different reasons. This has the effect of excluding sexual imagery from the religious symbolism in the West and of freeing erotic forms for the conveying of religious doctrine in India, especially in the Tantric sects. Thus, what is shocking to the Westerner has no evil associations for the Tantric Hindu.

A second factor leading the Hindu to an erotic symbolism is his identification of the divine and the good with the emotional aesthetic component, rather than the unseen theoretical component in the nature of things. For the Indian, and for the Oriental generally, as for the Western Spaniard, emotion or passion is of the essence of human nature and of the divine nature.

A third factor is that the undifferentiated, emotionally or passionately moving, ineffable aesthetic continuum which we have shown also
to be what is meant by tao, jen, Nirvana, and Brahman, is often referred to throughout all Oriental religions, as the female principle. It will be recalled that the Tao-Teh-King asserts—

The spirit of a valley is to be undying.
It is what is called "the Original Female,"
And the Doorway of the Original Female is called "the root from which heaven and earth sprang."

Similarly, India as a whole is referred to as "Mother India," and the Shakti doctrine of its Hinduism is by definition the doctrine of the worshippers of the emotional female principle in things. "Shakti in the highest causal sense is God as Mother, and in another sense it is the universe which issues from Her Womb." (Woodroffe)

This female divine factor, identified with the undifferentiated aesthetic component in things, may be considered in two aspects, both of which are essential to her nature. The Brahman, Chit, or Shakti may be considered in itself apart from its differentiations. When considered in this changeless aspect it is called Shiva. It may also be considered in the aspect of the source out of which its determinate, transitory differentiations come and to which in their death they return. This is the female principle in its creative, determinate, changing manifestations. The female divine principle differentiates itself, as has been previously noted, by the use of the limiting Maya principle which is "that Power by which infinite formless [Chit] . . . veils Itself to Itself and negates and limits Itself in order that it may experience Itself as Form."

In this process, as previously noted, the distinction arises between mind or the subjective differentiated personality (purusha) and any other natural object (prakritis). It is to be recalled that in the ritual even the highest of the Hindus does not escape completely from this subject-object otherness and dualism. Hence, what the ritual has to do is to exhibit the indeterminate, undifferentiated, aesthetic unity running through this difference between the personal self and its object. This is accomplished by identifying the differentiating Chit-veiling activity with one human figure in the religious symbolism, and the Chit-revealing Shiva, with another human figure, and then wedding the two male and female figures. Thus, as Sir John Woodroffe emphasizes, when the artistry and the ritual of the Tantric Hinduism are correctly understood their frankly sexual symbolism reveals a very mature and profound philosophical and religious doctrine.

A culture born of such a religion would hardly need a Freud. Even so, Hinduism is more subtle and restrained than Freudian psychology. The sexual passion, being determinate, leads to death, since all determinate aesthetic things are transitory. Nevertheless, sexual passion is the divine passion in one of its limited and veiled manifestations, since every determinate experience is a differentiation of the otherwise indeterminate aesthetic boundlessness which is Chit or Brahman. Consequently, the only lasting happiness and emotional satisfaction is obtained when one moves from this active, limited, human passion to the more passive, undifferentiated and hence timeless, ineffable, infinite self, which is the divine compassion.

Consequently, as Sir John Woodroffe emphasizes, even this Tantric ritual of Hinduism, while giving expression to the emotional, passionate nature of human beings, puts no premium or sanction upon sexual license. Only as the Tantric ritual, with its sexual symbolism, teaches one that determinate passions, being transitory, will never give permanent emotional satisfaction; and as it exhibits the indeterminate, all-embracing, compassionate aesthetic continuum common to all different things, thereby leading one on beyond the merely human portion of one's nature to the divine, is its character understood, or is the attention upon the sexual which it engenders given the sanction of either the Hindu morality or its religion.

Thus underlying the Tantric as well as all other forms of Hinduism and determining the ultimate aim and character not merely of all the Hindu treatises but also of all its art and its ritual is the same primacy and irreducible ultimacy of the indeterminate aesthetic component in things, given with immediacy, which has been found to be similarly basic in all the forms of Buddhism and in the "human-heartedness" of Confucianism as well as the Tao of Taoism. One is therefore able to understand what Ananda Coomaraswamy means when he writes in his Hinduism and Buddhism, "The more superficially one studies Buddhism, the more it seems to differ from the Brahmanism in which it originated; the more profound our study, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish Buddhism from Brahmanism, or to say in what respects, if any, Buddhism is really unorthodox."

Sir John Woodroffe adds:

To the Western, Indian Religion generally seems a "jungle" of contradictory beliefs amidst which he is lost. Only those who have understood its main principles can show them the path . . . It has been asserted that there is no such thing as Indian Religion, though there are many Religions in India. This is not so . . . there is a common Indian religion . . . which is
CHAPTER X

THE MEANING OF EASTERN CIVILIZATION

The meaning of Oriental civilization—that characteristic which sets it off from the West—may be stated very briefly. The Oriental portion of the world has concentrated its attention upon the nature of all things in their emotional and aesthetic, purely empirical and positivistic immediacy. It has tended to take as the sum total of the nature of things that totality of immediately apprehended fact which in this text has been termed the differentiated aesthetic continuum. Whereas the traditional West began with this continuum and still returns to local portions of it to confirm its syntactically formulated, postulationally prescribed theories of structures and objects, of which the items of the complex aesthetic continuum are mere correlates or signs, the East tends to concentrate its attention upon this differentiated aesthetic continuum in and for itself for its own sake.

ORIENTAL POSITIVISM AND REALISM

As a consequence, whereas the Orient is for the most part continuously positivistic, the West tends, as S. Luria and Max Planck have noted, to be positivistic only during those revolutionary transition periods in its historical development when the traditional scientific and philosophical doctrine has broken down in the face of new evidence, and before the new, more adequate one has been put forward to take its place. And even during these positivistic periods the aim in the West has been to bring attention back from the traditional doctrine to the immediately apprehended data in order to construct afresh a more deductively fertile and extensively verified new conception of the theoretic component.

It appears therefore that the meaning of Eastern civilization in its relation to the meaning of Western civilization is as follows: The Orient, for the most part, has investigated things in their aesthetic component; the Occident has investigated these things in their theoretic component. Consequently, each has something unique to contribute to
an adequate philosophy and its attendant adequate cultural ideal for the
contemporary world. The East and the West, when analyzed to deter-
mine their basic scientific and philosophical foundations, are found to
be saying, not, as Ananda Coomaraswamy has suggested, the same
thing; nor, as Kipling affirmed, two incompatible things; but, instead,
two different yet complementary things. Thus, although the two great
civilizations are different in a most fundamental and far-reaching way,
there can nonetheless be one world—the world of a single civilization
which takes as its criterion of the good a positivistic and theoretically
scientific philosophy which conceives of all things, man and nature alike,
as composed of the aesthetic component which the Orient has mastered
and the theoretic component which it is the genius of the Occident to
have pursued.

This means that the present meeting of the East and the West, to
which individual decisions in both parts of the world have already
committed mankind, may occur without conflict providing each under-
stands the other. It means also that this can occur with genuine addi-
tions to and enrichment (aesthetically, scientifically, economically, and
religiously) of the traditionally incomplete cultures of the two civil-
izations.

It is to be emphasized, however, that this happy possibility will not
come to pass automatically. Two things are requisite: First, the specific
relation between the aesthetic and theoretic components must be deter-
mined, thereby permitting the newly formulated world philosophy to
specify the theoretical criterion by means of which the two differing
cultures and their attendant different ideals, grounded in these two
components, can be combined so that they will reinforce and sustain
rather than convert, combat and destroy each other. This is by no
means an easy task, as the difficulty of clarifying the relation between
empirical aesthetic qualities and mathematical theoretic factors in New-
ton’s physics and modern Western philosophy clearly indicates. This is
the basic problem, and must soon concern this inquiry. Second, the
aesthetic component and the specific character of the Oriental culture
which is based upon it must be fully understood. This must now be
determined. The Oriental more positivistic concern with things in their
aesthetic immediacy has had two consequences which to a Westerner
seem self-contradictory. First, there is a stark kind of realism, a this-
worldly concern with the concrete, and an unflinching acceptance, in
religion as well as philosophy and practical life, of the pains, disappoint-
ments, the inescapable cruelties of the struggle for existence, and the

The Meaning of Eastern Civilization

inevitable death which we observe to overtake all determinate things,
whether these different things be the individual human personality or
the determinate natural object. Second—and it is this second factor
which distinguishes the positivism of the Orient from that of the West,
especially in the modern world—there is what seems to a Westerner an
excessively speculative other-worldliness. However, as was indicated
in the previous chapter, this turns out instead to be as positivistically im-
mediate and possessed of all the attendant stark realism which attaches to
the transitory, determinate differentiations which come and go within it.

All this becomes clear when it is realized that what is immediately
apprehended is the all-embracing differentiated aesthetic continuum,
every determinate sensed or introspected quality of which is transitory,
whereas its otherwise indeterminate intuitioned continuity is not perish-
able, yet, in part at least, is as positivistically and realistically given in
immediate apprehension as are its differentiations (Plate XIV). That
this is the case is shown by the fact that what one immediately appreh-
ends is not merely the atomic, transitory qualities, but also the other-
wise undifferentiated aesthetic continuum in which these occur, part of
which is indeterminate, as William James noted, even when the deter-
minate qualities in other parts of it are not abstracted.

Thus it is to be emphasized that when the Oriental designates the
Tao, Nirvana, Brahman, or Chit to be something which is not given
through the specific senses, he does not mean that it is a speculatively
postulated, syntactically designated, and only indirectly and experi-
mentally verified entity such as the mathematical, as opposed to the sensed,
space in Newton’s physics, or the unseen God the Father in the tradi-
tional Christianity of the West. He means, instead, as the previous
analyses of the major religions and cultures of the Far East have indi-
cated, something which is not inferred, not speculatively arrived at by
the logical scientific method of hypothesis, but which is immediately
experienced, its “transcendency” of the senses being due to the fact that
the senses deliver specific, limited, determinate data within it, whereas
it is indeterminate and all-embracing.

Precisely because of this the tremendous emphasis upon aesthetics
and the highly ineffable and mystical quality of Oriental culture arises.
What is given positivistically as pure fact, apart from all speculative
hypotheses, is colors, sounds, fragrances, and flavors in the aesthetic
continuum. All these are aesthetic materials. They are the kind of thing
with which the novelist, the painter, the musician, and the epicure deal.
Moreover, aesthetic vividness, feeling, and emotion are of their essence.
The Meeting of East and West

It is the beauty of the immediately apprehended aesthetic sunset which moves one, not Locke's or Berkeley's supposed mental substance. Moreover, none of these aesthetic factors can be conveyed to anyone who has not immediately apprehended them. This is precisely what is meant by the ineffable and the mystical. Thus the tremendous emphasis upon passion and aesthetics in religion and in daily life, and the obvious mystical emphasis in Oriental doctrines and in the practices of their Taoist and Chan Buddhist painters, is a consequence of, not in opposition to, their thoroughgoing positivism.

The positivists of the West have failed to arrive at this consequence of their position because, instead of using the immediately apprehended positivistic data to derive from them what they can give, they have used them to attempt to construct deductively formulated theory. More concretely, instead of attempting to get art from their positivism, they have attempted (unsuccessfully) to get mathematical physics and (with more success) the laws governing the movement of prices in the market place. The strength and the truth of positivism is in the realm of art of the Oriental type, and in a religion of the emotions. When one attempts to derive from it the mathematical physics and the philosophical doctrines of traditional Western culture the consequence is, as its own Western proponents insistently assert, that the basic concepts of mathematics become nothing but meaningless marks on paper, and that most of the traditional scientific and philosophical theories of Western civilization become similarly meaningless nonsense. The virtues and consequences of positivism are to be found in the East, not in the West.

This does not mean that positivism has not served a very important function in Western culture. This function has been, however, to plow under the old weeds and straw in those transition periods when, after the last season's crop has been harvested, the soil must be prepared for the planting and growing of the new. Consequently, whereas the positivism of the Orient functions positively and continuously to give its culture the religious and aesthetic, and extremely concrete realistic institutions and values which it enjoys, the positivism of the West functions more negatively, but nonetheless necessarily, during the transitional periods in its theoretically grounded culture when new empirical evidence forces a repudiation of the traditional doctrine and attendant social institutions, thereby preparing the way for the more adequate conception of the theoretic component and the attendantly more correct idea of the good for man and society which must replace the old one.

The Meaning of Eastern Civilization

The stark realism of Oriental culture merits attention more in detail. Nowhere does it exhibit itself more notably than in the attitude of the Buddha as portrayed in Edwin Arnold's *The Light of Asia*:

... But, looking deep, he saw
The thorns which grow upon this rose of life:
How the swart peasant sweated for his wage,
Toiling for leave to live; and how he urged
The great-eyed oxen through the flaming hours,
Goading their velvet flanks: then marked he, too,
How lizard fed on ant, and snake on him,
And kite on both; and how the fish-hawk robbed
The fish-tiger of that which it had seized;
The shrike chasing the bulbul, which did chase
The jewelled butterflies; till everywhere
Each slew a slayer and in turn was slain,
Life living upon death. So the fair show
Veiled one vast, savage, grim conspiracy
Of mutual murder, from the worm to man,
Who himself kills his fellow; ...

Even Darwin, with all his emphasis upon the struggle for existence,
was not more unflinchingly realistic than this.

But there is more:

... the taste is emptied from his mouth,
The hearing of his ears is clogged, the sight
Is blinded in his eyes; those whom he loved
Wail desolate, for even that must go,
The body, which was lamp unto the life,
Or worms will have a horrid feast of it.
Here is the common destiny of flesh:
The high and low, the good and bad, must die.

Nor does the doctrine of the reappearance of life after death in transmigration help:

... 'tis taught, begin anew and live
Somewhere, somehow,—who knows?—and so again
The pangs, the parting, and the lighted pile—
Such is man's round. ...
Since pleasures end in pain, and youth in age,
And love in loss, and life in hateful death,
And death in unknown lives, which will but yoke
Men to their wheel again to whirl the round
Of false delights and woes that are not false.
Me too this lure hath cheated ...

emphasis upon the ineffably indeterminate portion of man's nature and
the nature of things, are the most earthly, practical, and matter-of-fact
of people. So much is this the case that even the British or the Ameri-
cans, for all their supposed superiority with respect to the practical
virtues, are often shocked, when they find themselves in the Orient, by
the excessive prevalence of these traits. This stark realism and its attend-
ant tempering of the determinate general principle to the local circum-
stances and immediate intuition of the moment is so extreme in the
Orientals that when the Westerner, especially the moral and religious
missionary, finds himself in contact with them, his initial impression
tends to be that they are the most unequivocal opportunists, without
any moral principles whatever.

THE RELATIVITY OF DETERMINATE VALUES

This attitude is illustrated by the impatience with which an Amer-
ican missionary once voiced such an impression. A few years previously
he had been a halfback carrying the ball for his Methodist college in
the United States. The good old Western Christian spirit, according to
which one lays down one's life if necessary in order to get that specific
determinate touchdown was still in him. In the same spirit he was now
carrying the gospel in China. Neither in his morality nor in his religion
was there any wock yeh (perhaps!); everything was certain and deter-
minate. A man was not a man unless he was willing to lay down his
life for the determinate thesis. With this background he arrived one
afternoon fresh from his contact with his Christian Chinese converts.
"These Chinese," he exclaimed, "have no character. We make it clear
to them that becoming a Christian involves the complete dedication of
one's own life and will to the will of God. We point out specifically in
terms of concrete conduct what this involves. They seem to understand
and accept all that we say, becoming Christians. Then the first moment
this decision becomes the least bit inconvenient for them, they drop it."

Obviously, the Christian missionary was a little excited, and un-
doubtedly after further reflection he would have modified this judg-
ment considerably. But his overstatement was not his most serious error.
He had in fact come into direct contact with a factor in the Orient,
concept of the nature of things and in the Oriental character which
is undeniable there. His only error was that, viewing this factor from
the limited standpoint of the morality, religion, and culture of the
West, and having not even the slightest comprehension of the differe-
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CHAPTER XI

CONTEMPORARY INDIA, JAPAN, AND CHINA

The contemporary Orient is the product of its traditional self and the influence of the West. The latter influence is not of merely recent existence. In 327 B.C. Alexander the Great invaded India. Although his military conquest and rule were of short duration, they were by no means negligible in their permanent effects. For Alexander was accompanied by Greek artists, historians, and men of science.

Through these men Greek scientific ideas, particularly in the fields of mathematics and astronomy, definitely influenced the early Indian scientific outlook. Furthermore, the Greek Megasthenes was ambassador to the Court of Bengal from 306 B.C. to 298 B.C. In his reports he describes the seven castes of Hindu society in which the philosophers, who were the Brahmans, were at the top; and the inspectors, who were sages of the forest, were included. Thus there was not merely an influence of Greek thought upon the East but a corresponding effect of Oriental thought upon the West.

WESTERN INFLUENCES IN INDIA

Nor was the influence of the Greeks upon the Hindus and the Buddhists merely scientific in character. It also affected their art. The Greeks, like most of the later invaders from the Middle East, came into India from the northwest. As a consequence, their greatest influence exhibits itself in this section of India, notably in the Punjab and in Sind. Curiously enough, when one examines the art, and in particular the statuary in this region, and then moves toward the east to that part of even northern India into which the Greeks did not penetrate so deeply, one finds a phenomenon which the British author of the article on India in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th edition) describes as follows: "As we proceed eastward from the Punjab, the Greek type begins to fade. Purity of outline gives place to lusciousness of form." This difference can be understood in the light of previous analysis if it is realized that the Greek, in his art, is a Westerner who is attempting to
determinate type, grounded in the theoretic rather than the aesthet.
component in the nature of things, are necessary.
Jawaharlal Nehru, on the other hand, is by birth a high-caste Brahman, reared at the top of the Hindu hierarchical social system. One of his fellow-countrymen has termed him "The Thoroughbred." Because of Mahatma Gandhi's sacrifice for India, Jawaharlal Nehru is devoted to his senior leader. But he has gone much deeper beneath the political surface of things, into the scientific and philosophical roots of the modern Western political issues, than has the Mahatma. This has brought him into contact, not merely with Locke and Bentham, but also with Karl Marx and Russian communism. The latter has so deeply impressed him that he regards it as the only constructive solution, to date, of the ills of the Western world, and important if the Indian masses are ever to escape from their present low economic standard of living, and from superstition and disease. Like Gandhi he is dedicated to autonomy and self-government for India. But, unlike Gandhi, he has been so "filled . . . with horror" at the "spectacle of what is called religion, Orthodox, or Harani in his opinion, to make a new form of Christianity is no exception, in which was allowed the 'something else' expression again; and in truth, historically religious groups who truths by breaking head's
which is a Mohammedan culture, now some dozen centuries old and 80,000,000 strong, dominated by the uncompromising determinateness of a theistic religion: and when the West has established itself under the rule of a Britain divided against herself by her Elizabethan medievalism, her Mercantile and Non-Conformist Protestantism and her Locke-ean urge to tolerance and democracy. Add to this an Indian nationalistic movement headed by the religious, pacifistic Gandhi on the one hand and the Marxist-inclined Nehru on the other, and the India problem appears as one of the most complicated clashes of ideals which this world of conflict exhibits. This indeed is the test case for any solution of the basic ideological issues of these times. If a criterion of the good can show the way here, it should be adequate anywhere.

WESTF

The West to that for it political occupi the British in the States, up to the dominat

PACIFIC ISLANDS

The East Indies is similar China and Japan the been as extensive as with ties for the United States. But even in China dominat. Although the West had political and military control over the foreign concessions of China’s port cities, these port cities stood at the mouths of the great river systems of the whole of the country. These rivers are the transportation network of China. Consequently, anyone controlling the ports dominating these river systems, had a hold upon the entire economic life of China which was far greater than might appear to the casual observer.

Moreover, in this control, the United States has had a far greater part in recent years than its citizens have recognized. The Washington Conference held in 1922 deserves far more attention than it has received. First, it shifted Japan from its traditional alliance with Great Britain. Second, it caused the United States to cease depending upon the battleships of the British and the French, and their Civil Governors and military police to maintain order and stable conditions for banks and businessmen and even missionaries in Asia, by bringing the United States along with Japan, Great Britain, and France into the Four-Power agreement. This made the United States, as well as Japan, Great Britain, and France, financially and militarily responsible for maintain-
The Solution of the Basic Problem

and democratic values in the United States, Latin America, and Europe will be met, when the principle is discovered for relating the truths and attendant virtues in the modern and pre-modern components of Western civilization.

Analysis of each of these cultural and political elements and issues has revealed its basic assumptions. These assumptions turn out in every instance to be philosophical in character. Thus, cultures with differing political, economic, aesthetic and religious ideals or values are grounded in differing philosophical conceptions of the nature of man and of the universe. These diverse philosophical conceptions fall into two groups: those which differ because they refer to different factors in the nature of things, and those which conflict because they are affirming contradictory things of the same factor. The philosophy of the Orient with its attention upon things in their aesthetic immediacy in contrast with the philosophy of the West with its emphasis upon the theoretically designated and inferred factor in things exemplifies the first group; the medieval and modern worlds or traditional communist and democratic economic and political theory are instances of the second.

In the case of the former group, the task of relating the differing cultures is, in considerable part, that of removing the notion of each people that nothing but its theory is correct, thereby permitting each party to add to its own traditional ideals the equally perfect values of the other culture. Only in the field of Western religion, with its traditional claim to complete perfection, does this present any difficulty. The greater difficulty rests with the second group where real contradictions appear. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis enables the inquirer to understand the origin of these conflicts and to find the correct method for resolving them.

It will be recalled that cultures such as Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and Hinduism, which are reared almost exclusively on a philosophy grounded predominantly in the aesthetic component alone, merge quite happily. Those cultures on the other hand, such as medieval Aristotelianism, Lockeian Anglo-American democracy, Post-Kantian German voluntarism or idealism and Marxist communism, which emphasize the theoretic component in knowledge, are in conflict. Since this component is not immediately apprehended, but instead, as the chapter on the meaning of Western civilization has shown, is known only by the speculative scientific method of hypothesis confirmed indirectly and experimentally through its deductive consequences, this conflict is easy to understand: the scientific and philosophical founders of
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In Figure II, it is to be noted that the object (b), the person (a), and the intervening medium (c) are all in the same aesthetic-theoretic world of discourse. Consequently, no problem arises, as in the Cartesian and Lockean theory of material and mental substances, concerning the manner in which a material object in mathematical space and time can act upon a mental substance or knower, who is not in space and time; instead the event which is knowledge is the purely naturalistic interaction between one factor in the aesthetically immediate-theoretically designated complex of things and other such factors. In this manner, the distinctions and advances of modern science are not merely developed so that the difficulties and attendant ideological conflicts of traditional modern philosophy and culture are escaped, but the achievements of modern science are also reconciled with certain merits of the Greek and medieval psychology and philosophy, noted in the chapter on Roman Catholic culture. There, it will be recalled, was cited Aristotle’s assertion that the study of the soul falls within the science of nature, and that the act of gaining knowledge of the external object is a naturalistic process in which the form of the object passes into the intervening medium to affect the form of the knower’s living body, which, according to Aristotle, is the soul. It appears that scientific and philosophical foundations for the reconciliation of the correct and valuable elements in the medieval and modern portions of the Western world are at hand.

THE RECONCILIATION OF THE EAST AND THE WEST

At the same time the traditional opposition between the Orient and the Occident, as voiced by Kipling, is removed.

East is East and West is West,
And never the twain shall meet.

This situation arose because the East in its intuition and contemplation of things in their aesthetic immediacy, and the West in its pursuit of the theoretically known component, tended to brand the knowledge other than its own as illusory and evil. When the preceding analysis reveals both factors to be ultimate and irreducible the one to the other, and related by the two-termed relation of epistemic correlation, thereby insuring that the one cannot be regarded as the mere appearance of the other, the two civilizations are shown to supplement and reinforce each other. They can meet, not because they are saying the same thing, but because they are expressing different yet complementary things, both of which are required for an adequate and true conception of man’s self and his universe. Each can move into the new comprehensive world of the future, proud of its past and preserving its self-respect. Each also needs the other.

The practical consequences of taking the relation of epistemic correlation as a guiding principle for the relating of the East and the West are far-reaching. It means that Western religious leaders with an adequate idea of the good and the divine will go to the East more to acquire its religion of intuition and contemplation than to convert the Easterner to the Western theistic religion of doctrine and reform; just as Easterners come to Europe and America to acquire Western science and its more theoretically grounded determinate economic, political and religious values. It means also that no claim to a completely perfect religion can be made in either portion of the world until the unique insights of the religion of the East and those of the West are combined.

In purely Western terms, this entails that the Virgin Mary representing the emotional female aesthetic principle in things becomes as divine in her own right, after the actual practice in Chartres Cathedral and at Guadalupe, as is the Christ representing the unseen male rational principle in the nature of things. These consequences follow because the relation of epistemic correlation not merely distinguishes its two end-terms which are at the basis respectively of the East and the West, thereby giving each portion of the world something unique to contribute to the enrichment of the world’s civilization, but it also unites them.

With respect to the Orient the consequences are equally specific. In the previous chapter, contemporary India was shown to present the most difficult problem in traditionally conflicting cultural ideals and institutions. It is selected therefore as the test case.

To begin with, all attempts, after the manner of Gandhi, to return India to nothing but its traditional past are misguided. There is the theoretically known component of things to which Western culture gives predominant expression as well as the aesthetic component of the East; and the relation of epistemic correlation prescribes that each must be cultivated and both must be related. Each type of culture is already present in India; the theoretic component being represented in an early outmoded form by the theism of Mohammedan Indian as well as by the British from the West; the aesthetic component being present in part in Mohammedanism and unequivocally in Hindu and Buddhist India.

The character of knowledge of the theoretic component in things,
with which all theistic religions identify the divine, requires that this component, and hence Mohammedan theism, be conceived in terms of the content of contemporary scientific knowledge instead of in terms of that of Mohammed’s time. This follows, because, as was shown previously, all knowledge referring to inferred rather than immediately apprehended factors is a hypothesis a priori checked only indirectly a posteriori and hence must be continuously reconstructed with the increase of empirical information.

This is a rule holding for all cultures grounded in the theoretic component, and for economic and political as well as religious doctrines in such cultures. This is the case, it is to be re-emphasized, because of the method of hypothesis which alone justifies knowledge concerning unseen inferred theoretically designated factors in the nature of things. One fact with which a traditional conception of the theoretic component is incompatible is enough to show that conception to be false; all the facts so far known in support of it are, on the other hand, not enough to show it to be absolutely certain. The best that can be said of any doctrine concerning an unseen theistic God the Father or concerning any other instance of the theoretic component in things is that the doctrine consistently and deductively takes care of all the directly observable data known to date. But even this can be said only if the conception of the theoretic component is identified with the latest deductively formulated experimentally verified scientific knowledge concerning its nature. Consequently, a theism which identifies the Divine and the soul of man with the theoretic component as conceived in the time of Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Christ, Mohammed, St. Thomas, Locke or Hegel, is quite untrustworthy as a criterion of the divine and the good in the twentieth century.

Such a reform in Mohammedan India would accomplish two things. First, it would make its people aware of the tentative character of its beliefs, such as those of theism, which refer to the theoretic component in man and nature. Thereby, the absolutism, fanaticism and intolerance characteristic of much of traditional Mohammedanism would be softened down and its theism would take on more of the open-mindedness of Hinduism and the wook yej (Perhaps!) of the Cantonese Chinese, making possible a peaceful mutual enrichment of Hindu and Mohammedan India. Second, it would bring into India the latest Western scientific knowledge, and provide the mentality necessary to use it to remove the unspeakable disease and squalor existing at present, thereby generating an indigenous merging of the values of the traditional East and the contemporary West. Such a reform in Mohammedan India, given the proper Mohammedan leadership, is by no means beyond the range of practical possibility since such a transformation has occurred already in the Mohammedan culture of Turkey.

Our theory indicates also that a correct solution of the India problem must provide for the aesthetic component in man and nature. This component is already present in the Hindu and Buddhist portion of India’s people and culture. But here also a reform is necessary in which the aesthetic intuition frees itself, at least temporarily, from the determinant social forms of the caste system and the religious ritual, to take itself back to its original insight with respect to the real and the divine as immediately experienced and as indeterminate. This follows as a matter of principle because it is only as one goes back behind the forms of culture and reflective thought and social habits to the primitive pure intuition that one gets the aesthetic component in its purity and with life-giving freshness and vitality. Once the social rigidity is broken by this means, the natural tendency, noted in the preceding chapter, of Hinduism and other Oriental religions of the intuitive aesthetic type to welcome doctrines and cultures other than their own, will render equally possible the merging of Eastern intuitive and contemporary Western scientific and theoretical values in Hindu India. Such a reform within Hinduism, taking it away from its present rigid hierarchical social forms back to the original aesthetic intuition of the indeterminate Brahman, is quite within the range also of practical possibility, since there is a very old tradition in support of it, dating back to the Buddha in 600 B.C.

A similar reform in British India is also required. This is best treated as an instance of the reconstruction prescribed for the West by the principle which provides the solution of the basic problem of contemporary civilization. Certain parts of this reconstruction have been noted already; others pertaining to the ground of human freedom and the reconciliation of democracy and communism remain to be designated. But since the philosophy which defines these required reforms in the West is the one which has prescribed the required reforms in both Mohammedan and Hindu India, there is no difficulty in principle in finding a solution of the problem of reconciling the Mohammedan, Hindu and British portions of India.

Such an ideal three-fold reform is by no means easy, or something which can be accomplished quickly. However, it is not with the easy or the quick, but with a principle defining the ideal and the good, that
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This entire inquiry is concerned. Moreover, the question is whether anything short of a basic reconstruction in the present ideals of all parties to the India problem gets to the heart of the basic difficulty, and hence offers any hope of a genuine solution. In any event, the policy based on the indicated philosophical criterion of the good offers more hope of success than many current proposals, based as they are on foreign values local to the traditional modern Anglo-American West, since it builds on indigenous Mohammedan, Hindu and Buddhist foundations within India herself.

What must be realized is that in the India problem, as in all the other national and international ideological issues of this time, we are confronted, not with a simple issue between the good and the bad, but with a complex conflict between different conceptions of what is good. It is in the provincialism and inadequacy of the traditional ideals that the trouble in considerable part centers. Similarly it is in the solution of the philosophical problem underlying the traditional partial or outmoded conflicting ideals—a solution defining a more comprehensive and adequate idea of the good for our world—that an essential part at least of the prescription for the cure of the ills of these times is to be found. Since the stated solution of this philosophical problem alters basic conceptions in both the East and the West, it is hardly to be wondered at that reforms in the ideals of all—Christians, Hebrews and Americans as well as Mohammedans, Hindus and the British—are called for.

THE CRITERIA OF CULTURAL REFORM

An interesting contrast appears between the role for reforming a culture based on the aesthetic component and the role for improving one grounded in the theoretic component. In the former case, the more the contemporary institutions and practices conform to the original aesthetic intuition of the ancient and primitive past the better; in the latter case, the more they conform to the most technical scientific conceptions of the present the better. The reasons for this contrast are clear: Since the aesthetic component is immediately apprehended, and since mature reflection and the attendant social habits tend to obscure the original pure intuition, a society grounded in this component is likely to be more correct to the extent that its returns, as the Buddha, Confucius, and Lao Tzu counseled, to the original experience of its ancient past. Because the theoretic component is known only by hypothesis, and one's
part of the self as are the factors which distinguish that self from other persons and things. Thus, a philosophy of the state seems to be at hand with the specific criterion of private, local and world sovereignties that is required if the full freedom and integrity of the individual, which is one source of every great creative advance in civilization, is to be preserved, and if at the same time the sanctions for “one world” are to be guaranteed, which are so obviously required to solve by sympathetic, intelligent, lawful and peaceful means the inescapable national and international problems of these times.

It appears, therefore, when the paradoxically confusing and tragic conflicts of the world are analyzed one by one and then traced to the basic philosophical problem underlying them, and when this problem of the relation between immediately apprehended and theoretically inferred factors in things is then solved by replacing the traditional three-termed relation of appearance by the two-termed relation of epistemic correlation, that a realistically grounded, scientifically verifiable idea of the good for man and his world is provided in which the unique achievements of both the East and the West are united and the traditional incompatible and conflicting partial values of the different parts of the West are first reconstructed and then reconciled, so that each is seen to have something unique to contribute and all are reformed so as to supplement and reinforce instead of combat and destroy each other.

CHAPTER XIII

PRACTICAL WISDOM.

The realism which underlies the criterion of the good society at which this study has arrived cautions against expecting it to come into the lives of men and nations too easily. Also, it was noted at the outset of this inquiry that philosophical, political, economic and religious beliefs are not the only things making society and history what they are. There are famines, disease, climate and countless other non-ideological factors. Also there are the ignorance, the lassitude and the bursts of impulsive, misguided frenzy in each one of us and in mankind. And there are the hardened habits, institutions and sentiments formed by the partial, inadequate and often outmoded values of the past. A wise realism must be as realistic about what is in fact the case in society as it is about what ought to be the case. Consequently, as was emphasized in Chapter I, there must be the more descriptive purely factual social science, as well as the investigation of the correct norms for man and society with which this investigation has been primarily concerned. And practical wisdom presupposes that both types of social knowledge—the ideal and the actual—be kept in mind continuously and not confused, or corrupted the one by the other.

REALISM WITH RESPECT TO IDEALS

It is to be emphasized, however, that a genuine realism with respect to the *de facto* situation of a given people must take into account, as even the leaders of communism clearly recognize, the ideological beliefs to which that people has been conditioned by its traditional education, political propaganda, artistic creations, and religious ceremonies. These traditional ideological factors embodied in the institutions and emotions of the people are just as much a part of the *de facto* situation as are pestilences, the dyspepsia of the Prime Minister, the climate, the ethnology, or the course of pig iron prices in the market place.

Furthermore, unless observable novel ideologies are at work from within, or inescapable external pressure is upon a people from without,